1	STATE OF MINNESOTA	DISTRICT COURT
2	COUNTY OF RAMSEY	SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
3		
4	Minnesota Break the Bonds	District Court File No. 62-CV-11-10079
5	Campaign, Bil'in Popular Committee Against the Wall and	02-60-11-10079
6	Settlements, Women Against Military Madness-Middle East	
7	Committee, Lucia Wilkes Smith, Margaret Sarfehjooy, Catharine	
8	Abbott, Barbara Hill, Polly Mann, Leona Ross, Sylvia Schwarz,	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
9	Nadim Shamat, Sarah Martin, Robert Kosuth, Mary Eoloff,	OF MARCH 5, 2012
10	Nick Eoloff, Vern Simula, Cynthia Arnold, Newland F.	
11	Smith, III, Ronnie Barkan, Ofer Neiman, David Nir, Lehee	
12	Rothschild, Renen Raz, Dorothy Naor, Gal Lugassi, Boycott From	
13	Within and David Boehnke,	
14	Plaintiffs,	
15	VS.	
16	Minnesota State Board of Investment,	
17	Defendant.	
18		
19		tter came on for hearing
20	before The Honorable Margaret M. Marr Court, on March 5, 2012, in Courtroom	1480 of the Ramsey County
21	Courthouse in the City of St. Paul, M	
22	<u>APPEARAN</u> JORDAN KUSHNER, ESQ.,	and PETER NICKITAS, ESQ.,
23	appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs; KRISTYN ANDERSON, ESQ.	., Assistant Attorney
24	General, appeared on behalf of the de	etendant.
25	Court Reporter: Linda Horgan	
1		

MONDAY, MARCH 5, 2012

COURTROOM 1480, P.M.

WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had in open court at 2:30 p.m.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. Please have a seat.

The Court calls the case of Minnesota Break the Bonds Campaign, et al., versus the Minnesota State Board of Investment.

There are a number of people who are standing in the back of the courtroom. I am going to allow you on certain conditions to sit in the jury box, but let me make it clear what my rules are: Cell phones off, no reading, no conversation, no nothing. My court reporter is trying to take an accurate record of these proceedings, and if I find that anybody is disobeying those rules, the whole jury box will be out of the courtroom.

So those who are standing may take their places. There is room for 14 people.

(Pause in proceedings.)

THE COURT: And I know my clerk has already given you the instruction of the court. All cell phones are to be powered off, and I don't mean they're to be put on deaf and dumb; they are to be powered off. There is to be no recording of anything in this courtroom except for what the court reporter is doing. That is the official record.

If a cell phone or any electronic device does go

```
off during the course of the proceedings, the court will
1
   confiscate it and you will not get it back. But I know we're
2
3
   not going to have that problem.
                   The court has read the submissions of the
4
5
    parties.
             And I'm going to ask counsel around the table if you
   would make your appearances.
6
 7
                   MR. KUSHNER: Jordan Kushner representing the
    plaintiffs in this matter, and with me is co-counsel Peter
8
    Nickitas, and the directors from the Break the Bonds Campaign,
9
10
    Sylvia Schwarz and Elisabeth Geschiere.
11
                   THE COURT:
                               Now I'm going to ask that -- we know
12
    how to spell your name, of course -- that you spell the names
13
    of the persons at the table with you.
14
                   MR. KUSHNER: Okay. Peter Nickitas, last name
15
    is N-i-c-k-i-t-a-s; Sylvia Schwarz, first name is S-y-l-v-i-a,
16
    last name is S-c-h-w-a-r-z; Elisabeth Geschiere, first name is
    E-1-i-s-a-b-e-t-h, last name, I believe, is G-e-s-c-h-i-e-r-e.
17
18
                   THE COURT: Well done. Okay. You may have a
19
    seat.
20
                   And appearing on behalf of the state?
21
                   MS. ANDERSON: Kristyn Anderson from the
    Attorney General's Office on behalf of the State Board of
22
23
    Investment.
24
                   THE COURT: And that's Kristyn with a K?
25
                   MS. ANDERSON:
                                  It's Kristyn with -- it's
```

```
1
   K-r-i-s-t-y-n.
                   THE COURT: Thank you. And Anderson with an
2
3
   o-n?
                   MS. ANDERSON:
                                  Yes.
 4
                   THE COURT: Okay. One of the ground rules for
5
    both counsel with regard to the citation of any cases, please
6
7
    spell the case so that we get it accurately on the record.
8
                   This the motion of the plaintiffs -- or, wait --
9
    I believe it is.
                   MR. KUSHNER:
                                 There's cross motions.
10
11
                   MS. ANDERSON: They're cross-motions.
12
                   THE COURT:
                               They are cross motions. Let's start
    with the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on count one.
13
14
                   MR. KUSHNER: So you want me to just address --
    the summary judgment goes to the first count in the complaint.
15
16
    So do you want me to just address that and deal with counts two
    and three later --
17
                   THE COURT: I do.
18
19
                   MR. KUSHNER: -- in response to the state's
20
    motion to dismiss?
21
                   THE COURT: I think that would be more orderly.
22
                   MR. KUSHNER: Okay. Count one of the complaint
23
    is an issue of basic statutory interpretation. The Attorney
    General has suggested that we're trying to ask the court to
24
25
    challenge -- challenge policy and address a policy question,
```

but, actually, what this is is this was a -- this was a political decision by a state agency with financial responsibilities to make investments as a political statement where they've invested -- at this point they have \$23 million in Israeli bonds, which is --

THE COURT: I thought it was 18 million?

MR. KUSHNER: Yeah, it was -- the information that we had at the time that we filed the lawsuit based on the end of the 2010 reports was that it was about 17 million, and the report that the plaintiff -- that the defendants provided indicates that at least as of the end of December of 2011 it was about 23 million, so -- we have a list of the different sovereign bond investments, and so there's -- so the 23 million is more than all the other sovereign bond investments combined, which are 10 million.

And so the state argues that we're going to force them to divest millions and millions of dollars in bond investments; actually, this is all a tiny fraction of the \$53 billion investment portfolio that the State Board of Investment has, but out of these -- this \$34 million in foreign sovereign bond investments - 34 million, its total - 23 of those million, which is two-thirds, are Israeli investments. The next largest investment is in Mexican bonds, which is about 8 million, and then there's some small investments in other bonds.

The point here on count one is that it just --

it goes against the -- any common-sense reasonable reading of the state statutes that provides for what kind of investments that the state can make.

And so the -- the state is in -- they're relying on 11 -- this is 11A.24 of the Minnesota Statutes, and the state is relying on subdivision 6, sub (a)(5), which says they can invest in international securities as a list of five other investments that they can make in addition to investments that are listed earlier on in the statutes.

Now, the problem with this, if you just look at it -- the international securities exception, they're asking the court to interpret that section to allow any kind of international security, with that word -- that term is broadly interpreted as possible to include bonds, stocks, commercial paper, any kind of investments. And given the other restrictions in the statute, that interpretation doesn't make sense because this provides no restrictions what -- if you just read that clause alone it provides no restrictions whatsoever on the kind of international securities that could be purchased; they can purchase any kind of international securities whatsoever regardless of the financial stability of those securities.

And so our point is that that just -- that interpretation is absurd, especially when you look at the restrictions earlier on in the statutes.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So 11A.24, subdivision 2, talks about the conditions for purchasing government obligations, which would include sovereign bonds, and if you want to -- if the State Board of Investment wants to interpret -- purchase U.S. bonds or Canadian bonds, there are very strict terms. It says that either the -- either the -- the obligation has to be backed by the full faith and credit of the issuer or the issue -- the security -- the bond has to be rated among the top four quality ratings by a nationally recognized rating agency, and then it has narrow categories of government obligations that could be purchased, including U.S. bonds, Canadian bonds that are payable in U.S. dollars, as well as state or municipal bonds, and then certain -- bonds of certain international organizations like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American Development Bank, and a couple of other development banks or U.S. Government sponsored organizations.

So if you were to purchase a U.S. savings bond, it has to be backed -- or a Canadian bond for that matter has to be backed by the government or it has to have a rating -- a top rating by a nationally recognized rating agency and it has to be payable in U.S. dollars.

And, yet, when we get to international securities, based on the state's interpretation, if you're purchasing a foreign bond, which obviously doesn't have the

```
automatic -- inherent credibility of a U.S. bond and doesn't
1
   have the -- have the benefits of investing in something that
2
 3
    supports -- supports directly the United States or municipal
4
    bond or municipality, as the state reads that statute at this
5
    point there's -- none of those requirements are in place; it
    doesn't have to be backed by the full faith and credit of the
7
    issuing agency of that government or it doesn't have to be
8
    rated by any rating agency and it doesn't have to be payable in
    U.S. dollars.
9
10
                   So that's not a reasonable interpretation that
11
    the -- that the legislature would have intended to have such --
12
    such strict requirements when it comes to government
13
    obligations that apply to U.S. bonds or U.S. government
14
    sponsored organizations or Canadian bonds, but when it comes to
15
    foreign bonds that there wouldn't be any such requirement.
16
                   THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to interrupt you
17
    right now.
18
                   MR. KUSHNER: Yes.
19
                   THE COURT: Number one, I'd like you to take a
20
    breath every once in a while.
21
                   Secondly, we have an hour allocated for both
22
    sides, so each will get 30 minutes. So I should let you know I
    have read the submissions --
23
24
                   MR. KUSHNER:
                                 Okay.
25
                   THE COURT: -- of both of you and I've
```

highlighted things that I think are important. So if you would hit on those.

MR. KUSHNER: Okay.

THE COURT: And I know this is important, but hit on your major points so you fit within your timeframe.

MR. KUSHNER: Okay. So, you know, we've -- I posted -- we put together rules of construction that are critical here in order to get a sensible reading of the statutes, and it's important to recognize that the statute has to be read as a whole; it has to be interpreted in light of the surrounding sections, and words and phrases have to be read to avoid absurd results or unjust consequences. And then if there's -- if there are general and specific provisions of the statutes, the general provisions are taken into effect only to the degree that the general language is not within the language of the special provision, and they have to -- you know, general wording has to be read in conjunction with the specific wording.

So what -- so the only reasonable interpretation here is to look at the government obligations that are permitted as being limited by subdivision 2, and then under the -- under the category of other investments that are allowed, there are four previous ones, and so what's reasonable is to look at 5 as modifying 1 through 4, that you can purchase international securities that are within -- that are described

by categories 1 through 4 and that that's the reasonable reading of that provision.

Otherwise -- and in the case of Amaral versus

St. Cloud Hospital and KSTP -- Amaral is A-m-a-r-a-l -- and

KSTP versus Ramsey County it talks about that the statute is to be read to give effect to all of its provisions; no word, phrase or sentence shall be deemed superfluous, void or insignificant. And so unless we read international securities in conjunction with those other provisions that regulate purchases of various obligations, then those other requirements become superfluous and don't have any effect. So that's why it's critical to read the statutes as a whole.

And so an interpretation of securities on the basic dictionary definition is not reasonable in this circumstance. We've cited many court decisions in our brief that go through a lot of effort to try and define what securities means in various contexts. It's not that clear cut. But in this particular case securities needs to be read as being modified by the other language in the statutes.

Finally, SBI's own records indicate that even though they talked about agency deference, first of all agency deference is not applicable when you're interpreting the plain language of a statute and the meaning of the statutes. And their own records, which they themselves have partly provided and which we've provided, indicate that they didn't intend for

```
1
    international securities to apply to foreign government bonds
    because whereas they have guidelines -- very specific
 2
 3
    guidelines regarding corporate investments, corporate stocks,
    they haven't issued any kind of guidelines when it comes to
 4
 5
    foreign bonds. So the -- so it becomes clear that they
    themselves haven't understood this provision this way
 6
 7
    historically.
                   But, in any event, a reading of the statute for
 8
    the reasons in the brief requires that international securities
 9
10
    be limited and that foreign bonds can't be purchased under any
11
    condition but they have to be limited to the very specific
12
    conditions provided in subdivision 2 of the statutes.
13
                   And I guess I'll save the rest of my time in
14
    order to respond to the state.
                                    Thank you.
15
                   THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. From the state?
16
                   MS. ANDERSON: Your Honor, may it please the
17
    court.
18
                   If you'll permit me, Your Honor, I'd like to
19
    actually approach the bench with a copy of the -- a physical
    copy of 11A.24 because I think it may be easier to follow.
20
21
                   THE COURT:
                               Sure.
22
                   MS. ANDERSON: (Handing.)
23
                   Your Honor, I'd just like to take a tiny bit of
24
    time to walk through the statute because I think when we walk
25
    through the statute it becomes abundantly clear that the plain
```

meaning of "international securities" really does include foreign government bonds of the sort that we're talking about here.

And, of course, as Your Honor is very familiar, as a matter of statutory interpretation, if the plain meaning of a statute dictates a certain interpretation, then these canons of construction that counsel laid out are just not reachable.

The issue of <u>adjustum generis</u> and all of the other Latin phrases that counsel uses and even the concept of what's reasonable is not at issue. What's at issue is the plain meaning of the statute. And, in fact, one of the cases that I cited in my brief, <u>Hyatt</u>, H-y-a-t-t, <u>versus Anoka Police</u> <u>Department</u>, says that a reviewing court, even if it considers the result to be unreasonable or bad policy, it doesn't matter as long as the plain language dictates the result.

And here, Your Honor, I would posit, just as an aside, Counsel is not correct that there are just no standards that bind the State Board of Investment in investing in foreign government bonds. In fact, the State Board of Investment is bound by the prudent person standard and follows the prudent person standard, which is both imposed by Common Law and by the statute, in making all of its investments.

But, Your Honor, let's just walk through the statute: 11A.24. Authorized Investments. Subdivision 1 talks

about securities generally: "The State Board shall have the authority to purchase, sell, lend or exchange the following securities that are made subject to this section." And later on in that same subdivision it talks about the securities described in subdivisions 2 to 6.

So let's walk through 2 to 6. Subdivision 2, Government Obligations, Bonds of U.S. and Canada; Subdivision 3, Corporate Obligations, Bonds of U.S. and Canadian Companies; Subdivision 4, Other Obligations - things like certificates of deposits, commercial paper, et cetera; Subdivision 5, Corporate Stocks of United States and Canadian Domiciled Corporations; and, finally, we get to Subdivision 6, Other Investments - key here, Your Honor - in addition to the investments authorized in subdivisions 1 to 5 -- in addition to all of those that I've just listed, and in 1988 the legislature added number 5, International Securities.

Now, international securities, by the plain and ordinary common usage of the word "securities," securities includes bonds.

Your Honor, I took a look at -- I cited some definitions in my memorandum, but I also took a look at <u>Black's Law Dictionary</u>, 9th edition, 2009, on pages 1475 to 1476 to find "security." Definition number four: "An instrument that evidences the holder's ownership rights in a firm, e.g., a stock; the holder's creditor relationship with a firm or

government, e.g., a bond or the other rights, including an option."

So even the <u>Black's Law Dictionary</u> definition, a common usage of this term includes government bonds. And there's no dispute about whether "international" includes "foreign government" -- "foreign" because both of the parties agree with that. So, Your Honor, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "securities" just in terms of common usage includes government bonds.

But it's also instructive, Your Honor, to look at the statute itself. Subdivision 1, again, talks about "the following securities," securities described in subdivisions 2 to 6. Well, in subdivisions 2, 3 and 5 we're talking about stocks; we're talking about bonds.

It's very clear that the legislature intended when it talks in terms of the word "security" to include bonds. And, in fact, in my brief, Your Honor, I cited to several other Minnesota statutes where the legislature uses the catch-all term "securities" to include bonds. Again, Your Honor, the plain language, the plain meaning of "international securities" includes international government bonds.

Now, Your Honor, Counsel says that because subdivision 2 includes -- covers government obligations, government bonds, that that must mean that subdivision 6(a)(5) can't include government bonds. Well, this is wrong for a few

different reasons. Number one, that reading completely leaves out the beginning of subdivision 6, which says, "in addition to the investments identified in subdivisions 1 through 5."

Also this argument just proves too much because if what's covered under subdivision 2 -- if subdivision 6(a)(5), international securities, can't include anything that's included in subdivisions 2 through 5, that means that international securities not only don't include government bonds but, since subdivision 3 includes corporate obligations, that means international securities don't include corporate obligations.

It also means that since subdivision 5 includes corporate stocks, that means that international securities as used in 6(a)(5) also doesn't including international company stocks, and that's clearly, Your Honor, not what the legislature intended to do when using this broad catch-all "international securities" word.

Your Honor, I cited cases in my memorandum that talk about the fact that when the legislature uses this kind of catch-all phraseology, "international securities," they're clearly intending to sweep into that things that aren't included in other statutes, and especially when they use words like "in addition to investments that are authorized in subdivisions 1 through 5."

Your Honor, Counsel also wants to try to make an

argument that subdivision 6(a)(5) is limited to international varieties of what's addressed in subdivision 6(a)(1) through (4), but, Your Honor, that doesn't seem to make sense based on the plain language.

If you look on subdivision 6(a)(3), it talks about mutual funds registered under the Federal Investment Company Act of 1940. Obviously, that doesn't include international securities. You can't really gel those two. It's very clear that international securities means something very different.

And, frankly, Your Honor, the fact that this provision for international securities was added in 1988, after all of these other provisions, makes clear that the legislature meant to include something in international securities that wasn't included in any of the other provisions of 11A.24, 1 through 6(a)(4), something different all together, which includes, as a matter, again, of plain meaning, Your Honor, foreign government bonds.

And, Your Honor, even if you think that the statute is ambiguous, this court needs to look at longstanding agency interpretation, especially here where the agency actually requested the statute to be amended to include international securities and actually was involved in helping to draft it.

I included an affidavit from Howard Bicker, the

executive director of the SBI, who was the executive director in 1988 at the time the statute was amended to include international securities, and he makes clear that the -- what the SBI was asking for was authority to invest beyond what was already invested, allow for investments under the existing law. And, indeed, the SBI has since at least 1991 used that authority to invest in international government bonds.

Counsel for plaintiff talks about these guidelines -- these investment guidelines that the SBI has adopted and seems to argue that because those guidelines don't include foreign government bonds that that therefore must mean that the SBI doesn't actually think that it has the authority to invest in foreign government bonds.

But that's not the case and it's clear for two reasons. Number one, as I put in Mr. Bicker's affidavit, the SBI's reports over the years show that they have indeed been investing in foreign government bonds. And, as Mr. Bicker also explained, these guidelines for investment actually have absolutely nothing to do with government bonds at all; it's for the investment -- the stock pool, international stock pool. And the reason why those guidelines were created were really a reaction to concern expressed by unions and environmental groups about the competitive edge that companies -- foreign companies might get because of the -- of the countries that they were in, and so the board came up with these investment

guidelines to try to address those specific -- really specific issues raised by union and environmental interests that really only had to do with corporate issues.

So, again, Your Honor, the plain meaning of the statute is quite unavoidable here. It can't be argued that international securities doesn't include foreign government bonds when you look at the words of the statute. And for that reason, Your Honor, plaintiffs' motion should be denied and, frankly, defendant's motion should be granted really on the same basis.

And, Your Honor, I don't know if you want me to address the other issues in my motion or if I should sit and let Counsel rebut or how --

THE COURT: Here's what I would suggest, because we've -- we're not quite at the halfway mark here, and I assure you I have read your submissions; I took some time to do that last week -- I would suggest that you move right on into your motion and then Mr. Kushner can respond to that, and then if there's any time after that that you wish to clean up on any of these, that will be your option.

MS. ANDERSON: Thank you, Your Honor. That makes sense to me too.

Your Honor, the effect of what counsel for plaintiffs is asking for is that the State Board of Investment cannot invest in any foreign government bonds. That result --

the logical result of that is that the State Board of
Investment would have to divest from all of its dozen current
holdings in foreign government bonds.

But it's interesting, Your Honor, that's not the relief that plaintiffs seek. What plaintiffs seek in this lawsuit is divestment of only one country's bonds. And that leads me to the standing argument that I want to make, Your Honor.

Looking at the allegations of the complaint and the relief that plaintiffs are seeking, divestment from one country's bonds, it's clear, Your Honor, that the interests of the plaintiffs in this case really are a matter of policy disagreement. And policy disagreements, no matter how strongly felt - and I know that they are strongly felt - aren't sufficient to confer standing on parties.

Even when even taxpayers challenge an issue, if their primary issue with the statute is one of policy disagreement, there is no standing. And that's what we've got here, Your Honor.

Your Honor, what plaintiffs ask this court to do
-- and I'll do this very briefly -- is to get this court
involved in a matter of foreign policy that's highly political
and, frankly, not an area for this court to wade into. We have
cited cases directly on point in our brief which explain why
this type of very, very sensitive politicized policy issue is

just not one to be decided by the courts, both under the political question and the Act of State doctrines.

And, Your Honor, I cited to the <u>Doe versus</u>

<u>Israel</u> case and the <u>Caterpillar</u> case, both of which are absolutely directly on point and both of which find that these doctrines preclude courts from wading into these kinds of highly charged policy political decisions.

Even if this case were justiciable, though, Your Honor, we've also cited cases that are directly on point which show that the State Board of Investment's mere investment in bonds is so far removed from any potential alleged international law violations that it could never be the source of an aiding and abetting liability, which is really what their claims -- counts 2 and 3 boil down to.

Nestle, N-s-t-l-e [sic], says plaintiffs must allege something more than ordinary commercial transactions to state a claim for aiding and abetting. And that's exactly what -- plaintiffs' claim here is really it's a commercial transaction; the State Board of Investment has purchased government bonds.

Other cases that we cited in our brief, for example, the <u>In Re South African Apartheid Litigation</u>, there one of the defendants bought government bonds and the court said, "No, that is not the sort of action that could ever state a claim for aiding and abetting liability."

So, Your Honor, for all of these reasons not only is this case not justiciable but, even if it were, Your Honor, there's a failure to state a claim against the SBI absolutely, and the plain meaning of the statute permits these investments and this court should not grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs but should grant dismissal in favor of the defendants.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Kushner?

MR. KUSHNER: Thank you.

The plaintiffs are not just challenging the state on foreign policy. What they're doing -- what we're doing is we're challenging the state's decision to make foreign policy when it violates the statutes on count one, and on count two where it violates their obligations under the prudent person standards to follow the law with respect to international law.

We were specifically requesting divestment in Israeli bonds at the time we filed the lawsuit. The only foreign government bonds we were aware of that SBI invested in were Israeli bonds. We believe -- and there hasn't been discovery yet and that's one of the reasons why this motion to dismiss is very premature, but we weren't able to ascertain when these other bond investments were even purchased. We believe they were purchased after objections were raised by

Minnesota Break the Bonds Campaign to investments in Israeli bonds.

They talk about how this is going to have some big effect on their investment portfolio. It's a -- their foreign bond investments are a tiny portion of their overall portfolio. But the overwhelm -- as the first chart I presented to the court had showed, most of these foreign bond investments are specifically Israeli bonds. And so this was a specific design to make a political statement on their part.

Now, starting with what the plain meaning of the statute means, the plain meaning of the statute isn't just about what one specific phrase says, but it's about what one specific phrase means in light of the other provisions.

And so when subdivision 6(a) talks about that it can make these investments in addition, it doesn't mean that they can make any investments completely unmodified. What it means is they can make investments in addition to the previous investments as long as it's within the restrictions that are previously provided by the statutes.

Ms. Anderson talked about corporate obligations, which is subdivision 3. Well, in order to invest in a corporate obligation it has to be -- it has to be rated by a nationally recognized rating agency; it has to have a top rating, and it has to be payable in U.S. dollars. And so if we have those kinds of restrictions on domestic investments or

Canadian investments, it does not make sense that there be no such restriction when it comes to foreign investments.

The -- our position would not require the state to divest from all corporate stocks. Most -- most international corporate stocks are tradable on U.S. markets; they're repayable in U.S. dollars; they can be rated by a rating agency. We're talking specifically about sovereign bond investments where it's contradictory to interpret it in a manner that -- that the state is interpreting, which is that, whereas there's many restrictions for foreign -- for government obligations and corporate stocks in the previous provisions of the statutes, but then when it comes to international securities there's no restriction whatsoever and the state can purchase any stock or any bond it wants. That -- that eliminates all the restrictions previously in the statutes.

Subdivision 6(a), the previous provisions talk about investing in corporations, so it does provide the state with the ability to invest in corporate -- foreign corporate stocks. Because of the other restrictions on bonds, though, it does not permit investment in foreign sovereign bonds.

Now, on the -- let me just address the affidavit of Howard Bicker. He's not competent to testify as to legislative intent, and that's what the state is in effect doing with his affidavit when he talks about "This is why we asked for the change." He -- they're using him to be a witness

as to the legislative intent. It's not valid for a legislator to submit an affidavit and say, "This was our intent." That eliminates -- eviscerates the separation of powers -- the purposes of the separation of powers where the court needs to rely what's on the books [sic], what the legislative -- what the legislature passed, but the evidence is of legislative history.

So it's not based on what Howard Bicker thinks the legislative intent was, but it's based on what the -- what the statute says. It's based on what the statute says as a whole, not based on what portions of the -- not based on -- on what the -- on a specific witness, a lay person, who decides to say, "This is why we passed the statutes."

Now, on -- the state, I think, kind of mixes up the standing issues with the policy with its argument that we're trying to challenge policy. I don't think there's any question that the -- there's no question raised that some of the plaintiffs are actually stakeholders in the state pension funds; these are Minnesota Taxpayers and federal case law standing is conferred. As long as one of the plaintiffs has standing, standing is usually recognized for the group of plaintiffs.

Now, the state -- the state statute in a couple different provision under 356A specifically authorizes legal challenges to pension plans, including SBI, if they're

violating the law or they're violating their fiscal responsibilities. So there is basis for that challenge to be made.

And what the argument is is that they're violating the law and violating their fiscal responsibility by investing in bonds that aren't authorized by statutes, bonds that violate international law and could subject the state potentially to tort claims, lawsuits to the extent that they're participating in an illegal -- by financing directly government obligations that are used to finance a foreign -- illegal foreign occupation-- ongoing illegal foreign occupation and the displacement of another population by the occupy -- by the population of the occupying power.

The international law that Ms. Anderson cites in her brief we submit is inapplicable or outdated. The -- an act of state, when it violates the -- the Geneva convention on war crimes - and that's what we're alleging as stated in the complaint, that these are -- that this is financing of a war crime, the -- an act of state can be challenged.

That's indicated in the case that we cited, which is more recent -- much more recent than <u>Doe versus</u>

<u>Israel</u>, first <u>Lizarbe</u>, L-i-z-a-r-b-e, <u>versus Rondon</u>,

R-o-n-d-o-n, which is a 2009 case in the Federal District of Maryland, and what we think is a very significant case that was decided in 2011 in the Ninth Circuit, <u>Sarei</u>, S-a-r-e-i, <u>versus</u>

Rio Tinto, R-i-o, next word T-i-n-t-o, <u>Inc.</u>, and that was a Ninth Circuit 2011, which states when there is actually a violation of the -- of The War Crimes Act, that international law can be raised and acts of state can be challenged under those circumstances, and that was the basis for an international law challenge.

And we're also -- it's also critical to note that we're not here -- we're not challenging U.S. policy; we're challenging this -- and so the Act of State doctrine doesn't apply here; a political question doctrine -- political question doctrine doesn't apply. Act of state applies to foreign states. And then this is the basis where we can challenge it because of the type of violation it is.

But a political question doctrine applies to the U.S. Executive and Legislative branch; it limits the ability to challenge U.S. Government actions. But that's not what's involved here. We're specifically challenging state government actions, the actions of the Minnesota state government, and that it -- again, that it violates their own laws.

And we're challenging their decision to try and make foreign policy, but it's not -- so it's not U.S. foreign policy that's being challenged, but it's whether their -- Minnesota's own act of engaging in foreign policy is illegal under state statute and international law, and we do have standing to do that and there is jurisdiction to do that.

So there's a -- you know, another -- one other case that we cite here that says that claims for violations of international norms proscribing war crimes is <u>In Re Xe Services</u> - that's Z-e Services - a tort litigation -- actually, it's not Z-e but X-e.

The case that the state cites of <u>Jones versus</u>

<u>Baskin</u>, where it said that Israeli bonds is not imprudent, that was a private employment dispute; it was -- did not deal with any of the issues that we're dealing with in this particular case, and it just had to do with whether it was prudent investment based on there being poor returns.

Now, there's also -- the state raised the standard of what would constitute aiding and abetting. Their contention is that purchase of bonds is insufficient to constitute aiding and abetting.

Again, we think that there's recent authority that's instructive on that. One is <u>Presbyterian Church of Sudan versus Talisman Energy</u>, T-a-l-i-s-m-a-n, and that -- they rely on the standards based on Federal Common Law, the Nuremberg court and international tribunals, which is just knowing assistance to committing a violation. And that's also the standard that Minnesota courts adopted in <u>Matthews versus Eichorn Motors</u> - E-i-c-h-o-r-n, Motors - where they were dealing -- what the standard for civil liability is.

And so the appropriate standard for civil -- the

standard that's used for state civil liability should be the same when it comes -- or when the state court is applying what the standard is for international law violations.

And then also the <u>Sarei versus Rio Tinto</u> case, that the purpose -- the purpose of the action, that it's in furtherance of a crime -- it's whether there's purposeful action in furtherance of a war crime. And here SBI is making a political decision to invest in Israeli bonds knowing full well the international legal implications. And so that is sufficient for them to be potentially liable for aiding and abetting and why it's appropriate to order them to divest in these bonds under international law and international law as incorporated by the state law which requires pension plans to follow the law and act based on a prudent person standard.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. In response?

MS. ANDERSON: Just a few quick things, Your

18 Honor.

First of all, as to the issue of statutory construction, Counsel seems to argue that because 6(a)(5) international securities don't have the same sort of restriction as subdivision 2, that must mean that that provision doesn't include government bonds. Well, those sorts of restrictions also exist in the other subdivisions, and the fact is subdivision 6(a)(5) just says "International

Securities."

Again, the State Board of Investment is bound by its fiduciary duty. But the court, when the statute is plain, and it is, can't read things into a statute that the legislature omits. That's just not permissible under statutory construction.

The second point, Your Honor, we do not submit Howard Bicker's affidavit as a modicum of legislative intent. What we're submitting Howard Bicker's affidavit is to show what -- the longstanding interpretation of the agency in charge of the enforcement of the statute.

And one of the cases that I cited in my brief, Your Honor, is right on point, <u>Bremer</u>, B-r-e-m-e-r, versus <u>Commissioner of Taxation</u>, which says that courts give considerable weight to a construction contemporaneous with the statute's enactment by the agencies charged with its administration because that construction is, quote, "relevant and material evidence of the understanding and opinions of those who are charged with the responsibility of putting the statute in operation and who were familiar with and probably active in drafting the statute."

Mr. Bicker's affidavit shows what that contemporaneous understanding of that agency that's charged with enforcing this statute is and is used for that proposition.

Your Honor, the cases that we cited
<u>Caterpillar</u>, <u>Doe versus State of Israel</u> - directly show how the

Act of State doctrine and political question doctrines are at

play here and don't allow the court to wade into this issue.

The <u>Sarei</u> case that counsel cites to, although more recent, is very distinguishable. There the court noted that the foreign government at issue actually wrote a letter to the court urging the court to keep the case, to exercise jurisdiction. So there -- clearly there wasn't any sort of political question issue or issues of international comity that the political question doctrines and the Act of State doctrine are designed to address because there the foreign government was actually asking the court to wade in.

The other cases that Counsel cites, the <u>Talisman</u> case, all of these other cases, do support our position and, in fact, we cite to all these cases in our responsive brief and, frankly, our original brief. These cases say that where the court's decision -- actually, these cases stand for the proposition that where all the defendant -- alleged defendant is doing is acting in a business capacity - buying, selling, purchasing bonds - that that is simply not the sort of conduct that could ever lead to aiding and abetting liability.

And the <u>Talisman</u> case specifically says that to come to any other conclusion that the mere act of selling and purchasing would be foundation for an aiding and abetting claim

```
1
   would actually allow for private parties to impose embargoes on
    other countries, which the United States Government hasn't
2
 3
    itself done, which is, again, why this is right in the area of
 4
    political question and Act of State doctrines.
 5
                   So, Your Honor, again, defendant opposes
 6
    plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and asks this court to
    dismiss the lawsuit in its entirety.
 7
                   THE COURT:
                                Is there anything that you'd like to
 8
    say about the issue of the Geneva convention at all?
9
10
                   MS. ANDERSON:
                                   In terms of --
11
                   THE COURT: The position of the plaintiffs and
12
    as to whether the State of Minnesota by virtue of these kinds
    of investments is in violation of that convention?
13
14
                   MS. ANDERSON: And, Your Honor, that's exactly
15
    what the -- these cases - the <u>Talisman</u> case and the other cases
    - the Caterpillar case, the In Re South African Apartheid
16
17
    Litigation, the Doe versus Nestle case that Counsel themselves
    cite in their brief -- all of these cases stand for the
18
19
    proposition -- these are all aiding and abetting claims, all
20
    claims that say the underlying activity by the foreign
21
    government violates some convention. In <u>Caterpillar</u> it was the
22
    Geneva Convention, alleged violations by Israel of the Geneva
23
    Convention.
24
                   And all of those cases -- even assuming that an
25
    international law violation existed, all of those cases said
```

that the mere act of selling, of buying, of acting in the 1 marketplace, just like buying bonds, is not the sort of 2 activity that could ever lead to aiding and abetting liability 3 4 even if the underlying foreign government had violated a 5 convention. THE COURT: And I do have one question that you 6 7 might not have the answer to. MS. ANDERSON: Sure. 8 THE COURT: I think Mr. Kushner alluded to 9 10 Mexican bonds and other governmental bonds, not Canadian. 11 Do you have any sense of when those bonds were 12 Is this something new or is it something that's purchased? historically been the practice of the Investment Board? 13 14 MS. ANDERSON: Sure. Your Honor, what I have in 15 the record is starting in 1991 the State Board of Investment 16 invested in foreign government bonds; there it was the Korean 17 Development Bank and the European Investment Bank. 18 according to Howard Bicker's uncontested affidavit, the SBI has 19 been investing continuously in foreign government bonds since 20 at least 1991. 21 What I've got in the record for Mr. Howard 22 Bicker's affidavit is the current asset listing that's on their 23 website. You know, the assets that they hold change 24 constantly, and so what's on their website is the most current 25 listing as of December 31, 2011, and there are 12 different

1 foreign investments that are included on that. I don't know specifically when each of them were 2 3 purchased. You know, I suppose we can make some inferences 4 based on what the maturity dates are, but I don't actually have 5 at my fingertips the specific dates of when those bonds were --6 each of those bonds were purchased. But, again, since at least 1991 the SBI has 7 8 invested in foreign government bonds, and in 1993 they started investing in Israel bonds. 9 THE COURT: Okay. And this may be neither here 10 11 nor there for purposes of the legal discussion here, but to the 12 best of your knowledge is it accurate that at this point in time there is a total of \$34 million in bonds, 23 million of 13 14 which are Israeli bonds? 15 MS. ANDERSON: Again, Your Honor, all I have at my disposal is what's in the record, and that, again, is the 16 17 current -- as of December 31, 2011, asset listing. And in this asset listing there is a bond for 13.5 million for Aid Israel 18 19 and a State of Israel bond of 10 million listed, and then a 20 variety of other bonds. 21 THE COURT: Okay. And what is the total 22 invested, if you can tell, in international bonds? 23 MS. ANDERSON: I didn't do the math. I'm sorry,

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Okay. And,

24

25

Your Honor.

1 again, as I said, that may be neither here nor there, but --2 MS. ANDERSON: Right, right. And, obviously, 3 Your Honor, our argument is the plain meaning of the statute allows for these investments, and the SBI has been vested with 4 5 the discretionary ability to make investments that it thinks are prudent investments, and this is a prudent investment. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Kushner? 8 9 MR. KUSHNER: Thank you. 10 A few brief points. One, we're not in a 11 position to dispute or agree with the -- all the positions in 12 Howard Bicker's affidavit regarding the history of bond 13 investments. We need discovery in order to figure that out. 14 You know, development bank investments are not 15 necessarily the same as foreign government obligations. 16 development banks are private. They could be U.S. sponsored and then fall into subdivision 2, and that's -- to the degree 17 18 that that's relevant, we'd have to figure that out through 19 discovery. 20 For the standard of aiding and abetting, if 21 someone goes and invests in a business without knowing what's 22 involved, then they wouldn't necessarily be liable for aiding 23 and abetting. Aiding and abetting requires knowledge. 24 What is different about the State of Minnesota

is that they -- the government bond -- Israeli government bonds

25

go directly to the treasury and are directly supporting the illegal occupation, and the State of Minnesota is in a position to know that, and they're specifically -- based on their investment portfolio they are specifically investing in Israeli bonds to support Israel and its actions, which is a higher standard than what was -- was addressed in some of the other cases that say merely buying and selling isn't aiding and abetting. What we have here goes beyond buying and selling.

Certainly the <u>Rio Tinto</u> case did find liability based on a corporation's activities in a foreign country, and they didn't decide that there was -- that the case was justiciable because the government wrote a letter saying, "We support it;" it was based on a very careful, thorough application of international law, which we submit is instructive in this case.

One other point here about legislative interpretation and agency deference, the Minnesota Power case, which the -- which the state cites, dealt with the deference to an agency interpretation of a term as a result of a -- contested administrative proceedings. That's very different from this case. This was a -- contested administrative proceedings. There was evidence taken; there was very extensive deliberation and consideration by an administrative law judge to determine what the terms mean of a specific rule or sometimes a statute.

1 That didn't take place here. What took --2 what's taken place here is just an affidavit submitted by an 3 official for purposes of litigation to support what his 4 interpretation is of the statute. And under those 5 circumstances deference shouldn't apply, but we urge the court 6 to engage in its own independent common sense interpretation of 7 the statutes. Thank you very much. 8 THE COURT: Thank you. 9 10 And, finally, anything in response from the 11 state? 12 MS. ANDERSON: Just a couple of quick things, Your Honor. 13 14 In terms of the aiding and abetting liability, 15 Your Honor, I encourage you to read the Caterpillar case that I 16 cite, particularly the District Court opinion that really walks 17 through -- I mean there the Caterpillar Company was sued for 18 aiding and abetting international law violations by the fact 19 that they knew that their bulldozers were going to be used, and 20 the court found that that -- there was no even statement of a 21 claim for aiding and abetting there. 22 I can't imagine extrapolating from that that the 23 mere purchase of foreign government bonds could ever be aiding 24 and abetting.

And, again, the case -- another case that I

25

cited, the <u>In Re South African Apartheid Litigation</u>, there government bonds were purchased, defense bonds, and the Court said no -- failure to state a claim for aiding and abetting liability. So, again, Your Honor, the SBI's conduct is simply not the sort that could lead to an aiding and abetting claim.

And, finally, Your Honor, in terms of this issue of statutory construction and longstanding interpretations by -- by agencies, I cited in my brief to Emerson, M-e-r-s-o-n [sic], versus School Board of Independent School District 199, a very, very recent Minnesota Supreme Court case, and there the court found that even though it wasn't -- it was a school board interpretation that had been -- of a statute that had been a decade old or so -- applied for decades -- sorry -- and the court found that that interpretation was due the same sort of deference as an agency administrative interpretation even though it wasn't technically an agency interpretation under 645.168.

So courts are very -- very deferential to interpretations, particularly longstanding interpretations by agencies.

And, again, the SBI has been investing since
1991 in foreign government bonds. And just a quick rule search
that I did showed the Korean Development Bank and the European
Investment Bank are not privately held investment banks, but
they're government banks and government -- government bonds.

```
1
                   So, Your Honor, again, we ask this court to
 2
    dismiss this lawsuit.
 3
                   THE COURT: Okay. Anything further, Mr.
    Kushner?
 4
 5
                   MR. KUSHNER: Just a brief point. We're talking
    about Googling the information and that we need discovery in
 6
 7
    order to ascertain the facts on that.
                   I have nothing further.
 8
                   THE COURT: Okay. Obviously, there is a lot of
 9
10
    case law that has been cited by both sides in the memos that I
11
    have received, and although I have read your submissions, I
12
    have not checked the citations. And I'm glad that you
13
    highlighted from both sides certain of the cases that you
14
    believe are pivotal in this issue -- in this case.
15
                   It will take me some time to go through this.
    Don't expect an immediate answer on any of this.
16
17
    complicated to give you an answer from the bench. So I will do
18
    my best and use my own due diligence.
19
                   And what I'm going to do, though, is to ask each
20
    of you to submit to the court a proposed order reflecting,
21
    obviously, your own positions. And I think I have the luxury
22
    of giving you some time on that because you're not going to get
    a decision like this overnight.
23
                   Could you submit proposed orders -- I'll give
24
25
    you your choice -- in a week or two weeks?
```

```
1
                   Let's start -- Mr. Kushner, you're the
 2
    plaintiff.
 3
                   MR. KUSHNER: Well, if the choice is between one
 4
    or two weeks, we'll take the two weeks.
 5
                   THE COURT: Okay. Two weeks. Would you agree
 6
    with that, Counsel?
 7
                   MS. ANDERSON: I would be pleased with that,
    Your Honor. And do you mean findings of fact, conclusions of
 8
 9
    law and a proposed order?
10
                   THE COURT: I do, for both. And let's make them
11
    contemporaneous. So today is the 5th, so --
12
                   THE CLERK: The 19th.
                   THE COURT: The 19th? Does that work for you?
13
14
    Okay. Submissions on the 19th. By then I hope that I'll be up
15
    to speed with both sides here.
16
                   MS. ANDERSON: And, Your Honor, just one more
17
    question.
18
                   THE COURT: Yes?
19
                   MS. ANDERSON: Is it -- since we've got
20
    competing motions, is it okay if we address both -- both
21
    motions all together in one submission?
22
                   THE COURT: I think that would make sense.
23
                   Mr. Kushner, would you agree?
24
                   MR. KUSHNER: Yes.
25
                   THE COURT: Okay. And I'd like to thank
```

```
1
    everyone who's here. I know some of those seats are a little
 2
    uncomfortable and cramped in the back there, and those of you
 3
    who are standing, even less so. But thank you for your
 4
    courtesy.
 5
                   MR. KUSHNER: Do you want us to submit them
 6
    electronically?
 7
                   THE COURT: Well, here's what I'd like you to
 8
         Submit them electronically, but would you also send a hard
    copy, a courtesy copy, to my chambers, please?
 9
                   MR. KUSHNER:
10
                                  Okay.
                   THE COURT: Great. Thank you.
11
12
                   (Court adjourned at 3:30 p.m.)
13
                                --000--
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE	
2		
3	I, LINDA M. HORGAN, an Official Court Reporter	
4	for the Second Judicial District, hereby certify the foregoing	
5	forty (40) pages to be a true and complete transcription of my	
6	original stenographic notes taken herein.	
7		
8	Dated: March 19, 2012 Linda M. Horgan, RPR	
10	Official Court Reporter 1430 Ramsey County Courthouse	
11	15 West Kellogg Boulevard St. Paul, MN 55102	
12	651.266.9182	
13		
14	000	
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
2324		
25		
20		